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One of the most striking developments in American criminal law and
procedure in the past four decades has been the widespread establishment of
victims’ rights at both the federal and state levels. For supporters of victims’
rights, the story is one of almost universal success. Every state now has a
statutory or constitutional provision requiring that many victims of crime
receive notice of and the right to participate in any criminal proceedings
against the alleged perpetrators in some fashion.1 This is a tectonic shift
compared with previous attitudes toward victim participation given the longstanding emphasis on prosecutors alone controlling the state’s proceedings
against an accused. Victims’ rights came to be recognized by the federal
government as well, with the passage of federal statutes providing for victim
participation in federal court proceedings.2 The U.S. Department of Justice
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1. See Steven J. Twist & Daniel Seiden, The Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment: A
Brief Point/Counterpoint, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 341, 344 (2012).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2012).
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and all fifty states now have some form of victims’ rights legislation, and many
private organizations actively support the movement as well.3
A conspicuous exception to the success of the victims’ rights movement has
been the failure of Congress to pass a proposed amendment to the U.S.
Constitution that would uniformly establish such rights in all federal and state
courts. This has not been a fringe effort. Advanced by both private
organizations and state officials, and with bipartisan support in Congress, bills
establishing a Victims’ Rights Amendment (VRA) have been introduced
several times in the past three decades and twice passed the Senate Judiciary
Committee.4 Several proposals for a VRA have been introduced in recent
years.5 Despite the apparent strong support among members of Congress and
the public, the bills have not progressed further; however, it seems likely that
there will be additional future efforts to pass similar bills.6
Adoption of the VRA, or any federal legislation mandating recognition of
victims’ rights at both the federal and state levels, of course raises federalism
concerns.7 The now considerable scholarly literature on the proposed VRA is
not oblivious to federalism issues, but has not fully engaged them, either.8
Supporters of the VRA have not convincingly argued that an addition to the
Bill of Rights is necessary given the widespread recognition of victims’ rights
at the state level.9 Conversely, critics of the VRA have argued that
nationalizing victims’ rights is inappropriate, even though they support the
imposition of federal standards in many other aspects of state criminal
proceedings.10 This Article undertakes a fresh and critical examination of the
3. For overviews of these developments, see Paul G. Cassell, The Victims’ Rights
Amendment: A Sympathetic, Clause-by-Clause Analysis, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 301, 303‒04 (2012);
see also infra Part I. See generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST,
VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2010).
4. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong. (1996).
5. See H.R.J. Res. 106, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 40, 113th Cong. (2013); H.J. Res.
45, 114th Cong. (2015).
6. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 304‒05; infra Part II.A.
7. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 316‒17 (discussing the VRA and federalism). Short of a
constitutional amendment, Congress could pass legislation that accomplishes essentially the same
result, for instance by conditioning state receipt of federal funds on the adoption of certain
minimum protections for crime victims. Congress has taken such a path with community
notification laws for sex offenders and other measures that aid victims in various ways. See
Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 51, 52 (2008). Another recent example of such federal intervention is the Obama
Administration’s initiative to improve steps colleges take to protect students from sexual assault.
See NOT ALONE: THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS
FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT 2‒4 (April 2014), https://www.notalone.gov/assets/report.pdf; see also
Richard Pérez-Peña & Kate Taylor, Fight Against Sex Assaults Holds Colleges to Account, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2014, at A1.
8. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 3, at 301‒02.
9. Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’ Rights? The Nature of the Opposition to
Pro-Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 157, 170 (1992).
10. See Twist & Seiden, supra note 1, at 360.
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federalism implications of the VRA, and of the arguments by both its
supporters and critics. Furthermore, this Article concludes that application of
the functional arguments in favor of federalism, such as promoting state
experimentation and permitting state law to govern in the absence of interstate
externalities, suggests that the VRA should not be passed. More generally, this
Article sets out criteria that will guide policymakers in deciding when, if ever,
to require all states to follow a uniform victims’ rights regime, by way of the
VRA or some other means.
By the same token, this Article does not argue that the federal government
does not have a role to play in the application or development of victims’
rights under state law. One solution allows federal courts to account for
certain aspects of victims’ rights when considering petitions for writs of habeas
corpus by state prisoners. To date, most federal courts have not been presented
with this novel issue, but the courts that have encountered it have held that
victims of state-prosecuted crimes have limited or no rights to participate in
federal habeas proceedings.11 This Article argues that, properly interpreted,
federal statutes indeed permit interested victims to meaningfully participate in
federal habeas proceedings, and it should be encouraged.
Part I of this Article begins by outlining the ascension of the victims’ rights
movement and its embodiment in state constitutional and statutory provisions.
Part I then considers how states have implemented these provisions. Part II
addresses the proposed VRA from a federalism perspective. It first outlines
the history of congressional efforts to pass the VRA, and then considers and
critically evaluates the federalism arguments made by both supporters and
opponents of the VRA. Part III examines whether passage of the VRA would
empower federal courts to enforce its provisions through injunctive actions,
and whether, and to what extent, federal courts would be likely to do so. Part
III also discusses whether, and to what extent, federal courts in habeas corpus
actions should enforce victims’ rights when reviewing the legality of
convictions resulting from state prosecutions.
I. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN THE STATES
A. The Victims’ Rights Movement and Variability of Victims’ Rights Among
the States
Since the 1960s there has been support for victims’ rights in criminal
proceedings at both the state and federal levels. The victims’ rights movement
sought the enactment of legislation and public policy changes in order to offer
victims ways to participate in and be heard during the criminal justice process
concerning their victimization.12 The movement also sought to provide
protection, compensation, and services for victims of crime as well as affected
11. See, e.g., Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 136 (4th Cir. 2011).
12. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 303‒07.
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family members.13 While it is widely assumed that the victims’ rights
movement began in the early 1970s, by then states had already begun to
advance policies and programs aimed at victim advocacy.14 For example, in
1965, California began to provide compensation to qualifying victims in order
to lessen the financial impact of crime.15 These policies may have grown out
of President Lyndon Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice.16 The President’s Commission was designed to
“assess the extent of the crime problem” in response to the growing crime rate
in the United States.17 The Commission found that a significant proportion of
victims did not report crimes, thus resulting in the creation of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), which was established to
help “fund and advise programs” involved in the prevention of victimization.18
The LEAA hoped that crime-reporting rates would increase in response to its
support of prevention and intervention efforts for victims of crime.19
Victims’ rights advocates were especially active at the state level in the
following decades. The emergence of the victims’ rights movement at the state
level was facilitated by Congress passing the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) in
1984, which “provided funds for victim assistance programs, victim
compensation, and discretionary funding for research on victim needs.”20 In
1986, victims’ rights advocates formed the National Victims’ Constitutional
Amendment Network (NVCAN) to lobby for a federal constitutional
amendment, though it initially devoted its efforts—quite successfully—in
support of state constitutional or statutory provisions codifying victims’
rights.21 Following the passage of the VOCA and California’s example, and
due to the efforts of the NVCAN, states began to expand their own
compensatory programs and protections for victims in their respective
constitutions and statutory provisions.22
One of the most notable accomplishments of the victims’ rights movement
was giving victims the right to be heard. Prior to the 1970s, victims did not
participate in the criminal process unless they were asked or required to

13. See Mary L. Boland & Russell Butler, Crime Victims’ Rights: From Illusion to Reality,
24 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5‒6 (2009).
14. See Jeanne M. Mastrocinque, An Overview of the Victims’ Rights Movement: Historical,
Legislative, and Research Developments, 4 SOC. COMPASS 95, 95 (2010).
15. Id. at 96.
16. Id. at 95‒96.
17. Id. at 96.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Victims and Victimization: Rights of Victims, NAT’L INST. JUST. (2008), http://www.
nij.gov/topics/victims-victimization/rights.htm; see infra Part II.
21. Victoria Schwartz, Recent Development, The Victims’ Rights Amendment, 42 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 525, 525‒30 (2005).
22. Mastrocinque, supra note 14, at 97‒98.

2015]

Federalism, Federal Courts, and Victims' Rights

913

testify.23 Again, California led the way for victims’ rights by requesting the
first victim impact statement in 1976.24 Generally, a victim impact statement
is a written or oral statement provided by a crime victim, or the victim’s
family, that provides information about the physical, psychological, emotional,
and financial harm that the crime had on the victim.25 A victim impact
statement is typically presented during pre-sentencing and parole hearings.26
By 1992, at least thirteen states allowed victim impact evidence to be
submitted at capital sentencing hearings.27 Currently, all states allow victim
impact statements during some phase of the sentencing process and at parole
hearings.28
By 2003, all fifty states had victims’ compensation programs and some form
of victims’ rights legislation.29 To date, thirty-three states have constitutional
provisions protecting victims’ rights.30 Moreover, all states have statutory
provisions that protect victims’ rights.31 Most states’ provisions offer victims
23. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 303.
24. ELLEN K. ALEXANDER & JANICE HARRIS LORD, IMPACT STATEMENTS: A VICTIM’S
RIGHT TO SPEAK, A NATION’S RESPONSIBILITY TO LISTEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (1994),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/reports/impact/welcome.html.
25. Victim Impact Statements, Nat’l Ctr. for Victims of Crime (2008), http://www.
victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get.help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/victim-impact-stat
ements.
26. Id.
27. Michael Ira Oberlander, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital
Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1621, 1647 (1992).
28. Victim Impact Statements, supra note 25.
29. Victims and Victimization: Rights of Victims, supra note 20.
30. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1;
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; COLO. CONST. art. II, §16a; CONN. CONST. art. XXIX, § b; FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 16; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13b; KAN.
CONST. art. 15, § 15; LA. CONST. art. I, § 25; MD. CONST. art. IV; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24;
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 32; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28; NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 28; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 37; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34; OR. CONST. art. I, §
42; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35; TEX. CONST. art.
I, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8a; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35; WIS.
CONST. art. I, § 9m. For a comprehensive breakdown of victims’ compensation by state, see
Summary of State Requirements and Maximum Benefits, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM
COMPENSATION BDS. (2013), http://www.nacvcb.org/ [hereinafter NACVCB]; see Appendix.
31. ALA. CODE §§ 15-23-1, 41-84 (2014); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2014); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4401‒4439 (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-90-1101‒1115 (2014); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 679‒680 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-100.1‒304 (2015); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9401‒9419 (2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 960.001‒.298 (West 2014); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.1 (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5306 (2015); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 120/1-9 (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-40-5-1 to 35-40-13-5 (West 2014); IOWA
CODE §§ 915.10‒.100 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7301‒7321 (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 421.500‒.576 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1841‒1845 (2014); ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 15, § 6101 (2015); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 1171‒1177 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 258B, §§ 1-3, 5-13 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.751‒.911 (West 2014);
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the following rights: to be present at criminal proceedings, to information and
notification, to protection, to due process, to compensation, to be heard, and to
a timely disposition of the case.32 All of this information is compiled in the
Appendix.
While virtually every state provides all of these rights via constitutional or
statutory provisions, the zeal with which they are enforced, or the lack thereof,
differs based on numerous factors, such as jurisdiction, judicial discretion, and
budgetary limitations.33 The inconsistency of enforcement among the states is
used as a primary argument in favor of enacting a VRA.34 While most states
provide in their constitutions or statutes that victims have the right to the
provisions discussed above, programs vary considerably across states. Some
of these differences are grounded in basic definitions of who is a “victim,”35 or
how to determine what length of time satisfies the “speedy” trial guarantee.36
Other interstate differences depend on the scope of the right accorded the
victim. One example is the victim compensation filing times and maximum
payouts per state, found in the Appendix. For instance, Alabama and Ohio
differ considerably in their filing time and maximum compensation for

MINN. STAT. § 611A (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-43-1‒49 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. §§
595.010‒.218 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-101‒133 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 811848 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.015 (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-k
(2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:12-14 (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-26-4‒10 (West 2014);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.42 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 142A–B (2014); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 147.405‒.421 (2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11.201 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 12-28-1‒13 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-22-90 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
23A‒28C-16 (2015); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. §§ 56.01‒64 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-38-1-7 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-37-1‒5 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 5301‒5322 (2015); WIS. STAT. §§ 950.01‒.11 (2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-21-102‒103
(2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-6-501‒509 (2015). See also Schwartz, supra note 21, at
527‒28.
32. See supra notes 30‒31 and accompanying text.
33. Cassell, supra note 3, at 303‒09; Schwartz, supra note 21, at 546‒48.
34. Cassell, supra note 3, at 303; infra Part II. It is unclear whether any systematic factors
account for the variance of victims’ right among the states. Studies of interstate policy diffusion
for criminal justice examine, among other variables, the geographic proximity, political ideology,
crime rates, and public opinion of different jurisdictions. See, e.g., Tiffany Bergin, How and Why
Do Criminal Justice Public Policies Spread Throughout U.S. States? A Critical Review of the
Diffusion Literature, 22 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 403, 405 (2011); Todd Makse & Craig Volden,
The Role of Policy Attributes in the Diffusion of Innovations, 73 J. POL. 108, 108 (2011).
However, these studies do not show a correlation between these variables and the rapidity or
scope of the adoption of victims’ rights. E.g., Scott P. Hays, Influences on Reinvention During
the Diffusion of Innovations, 49 POL. RES. Q. 631, 642 (1996) (studying diffusion of victims’
compensation laws).
35. Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim
Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 153‒55 (1999).
36. Mary Beth Ricke, Note, Victims’ Right to a Speedy Trial: Shortcomings, Improvements,
and Alternatives to Legislative Protection, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 181, 184‒86 (2013).
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victims.37 Alabama has a one-year filing limit for victims’ compensation;
meaning that the victim has one year from the date the crime is reported to file
for compensation from the state.38 The maximum amount that a victim can
receive from Alabama is $15,000.39 In contrast, Ohio has no time limit on
when a victim may file for compensation, and there is a maximum $50,000
payout.40
The Justice Fellowship recently commissioned a report showing the amount
of compensation paid out to victims by states through their compensation
programs.41 The report examined the average amount each state’s victim
compensation fund directly paid to victims of violent crime in 2012.42 Rates
ranged from close to $1,300 to $25. In 2012, there were nearly seven million
victims of violent crime aged twelve and older.43 Meanwhile, victim
compensation funds assist approximately 200,000 victims of crime annually
and award nearly $500 million to them.44 Thus, only a fraction of victims are
receiving the funds they are entitled to, with varying levels of compensation
among the states.45
B. Victim Impact Statements
One of the most notable changes in the criminal justice process, largely due
to the victims’ rights movement, was the inclusion of victim impact statements
during both trials and parole hearings.46 A victim impact statement gives the
victim a voice during the criminal justice process, and all states recognize the
right of victims to be heard.47 While all states allow victim impact statements
to be presented and considered some time before the sentencing process, when,
where, and how they are delivered varies considerably depending on the
jurisdiction and judge.48 Most states allow the victim to present either an oral
or written statement for a designated parole officer to include in the offender’s
pre-sentencing report, which is then considered by the judge.49 Other times,
37. ALA. CODE § 15-23-15(a)‒(b) (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.42 (West 2011).
38. ALA. CODE § 15-23-12(a)(1) (2014).
39. Id. § 15-23-12(b).
40. See Appendix; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.42.
41. DOUGLAS N. EVANS, COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF CRIME 1 (2014).
42. Id. at 6.
43. Id. at 1.
44. Id.
45. Id. Improvements that could and should be made to benefit victims of crime beyond the
scope of this article. For proposals that could improve victims’ awareness concerning the
programs and funds available to crime victims, see id. at 15‒19.
46. See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
611, 611 (2009).
47. Id. at 614‒15.
48. Damon Pitt, No Payne, No Gain? Revisiting Victim Impact Statements After Twenty
Years in Effect, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 475, 485 (2013).
49. Victim Impact Statements, supra note 25.
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the victim is allowed to present a statement in court during the sentencing
hearing.50 The presentation of the victim impact statement may take place in
front of and be directed at the accused; however, this is not always the case.51
New York provides an illustrative example of one approach to the victim
impact statement process during pre-sentencing. In New York, victims or their
family members have the right to orally address the court on “any matter
relevant” to sentencing.52 The judge maintains discretion to decide whether or
not to allow a family member to speak.53 Judges can restrict the number of
indirectly affected victims (i.e., family members) who may present statements
during the pre-sentencing process.54 One study concerning the regulation of
victim impact statements in New York found that only one-third to one-half of
the families interviewed were allowed to face the offender at sentencing in
order to present their impact statements.55
Victim impact statements may also be presented to parole boards prior to or
during parole hearings.56 This process is very similar to a victim impact
statement presentation at a pre-sentencing hearing; it can be done in-person or
through a written statement.57 As with pre-sentencing hearings, states vary on
how and when they allow victims to present their statements.58 In order to
highlight the differences, the Appendix describes the different presentation
formats that states allow for victim impact statements at parole hearings.59 In
some states, the victim may be present at the hearing, while in others victims
may only submit written or oral statements to the board prior to the hearing.60

50. Id.
51. Christine M. Englebrecht, Where Do I Stand?: An Exploration of the Rules that
Regulate Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System, 7 VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 161,
167‒79 (2012).
52. Id. at 167.
53. Id. at 167‒68.
54. Id. at 167‒69.
55. Id. at 174.
56. Kathryn Morgan & Brent L. Smith, Victims, Punishment, and Parole: The Effect of
Victim Participation on Parole Hearings, 4 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 334 (2005).
57. Id. at 336.
58. See Appendix. While using victim impact statements varies based on the jurisdiction,
the use of victim impact statements has proven controversial regarding its potential impact on
components of the criminal justice process, such as sentence length and parole decisions. Studies
regarding the potential impact of victim impact statements have not found a definitive answer.
See, e.g., Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of
Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 447 (2003); Bryan Myers, Steven J. Lynn & Jack
Arbuthnot, Victim Impact Testimony and Juror Judgment: The Effects of Harm Information and
Witness Demeanor, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2393, 2396 (2002); Theodore Eisenberg,
Stephen P. Gravey & Martin T. Wells, Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in
South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 318‒19 (2003); Morgan & Smith, supra
note 56, at 333‒34; Pitt, supra note 48, at 488‒93.
59. See Appendix.
60. Nadler & Rose, supra note 58, at 427.
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C. The Future of Victims’ Rights in the States
The expansion of victims’ rights at the state level continues seemingly
unabated.61 For example, in 2013, Hawaii’s State Senate unanimously passed
a constitutional amendment for victims’ rights, putting the state another step
closer to a constitutional amendment in conjunction with its statutory
provisions.62 In 2011, the Ohio Attorney General expanded the state’s
compensation program by eliminating the ten year deadline for victims to file a
claim.63 Likewise, the cap for fees on individual attorneys or law firms was
eliminated.64 In 2013, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett signed legislation
allowing crime victims and their families to speak directly to members of the
State Board of Probation and Parole.65 Prior to this legislation, victims were
only allowed to testify to the parole board through written statements and
phone calls, but not in person.66
Oftentimes state provisions exceed those that have been proposed or
implemented federally.67 For instance, in 2013, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey ruled that a criminal defendant does not have the absolute right to miss
his sentencing hearing when the victim is prepared to make a statement.68 This
ruling was in response to a defendant who did not want to listen to the reading
of the victim impact statement during sentencing.69 The unanimous court held
that “[t]here can be little doubt that from the standpoint of the victims, who are
to be treated with fairness, compassion, respect, and dignity, their statements at
sentencing will carry more meaning if they are heard not only by the judge but
the defendant as well.”70
Victims have not only state-funded programs, but also those of many nongovernmental organizations at their disposal. These programs provide
resources to victims of crime at the national, state, and local levels.71 Non-

61. This is not to say that victims’ rights advocates lack concerns. Some advocates argue
that both federal and state victims’ rights provisions sometimes lack robust enforcement due to
recalcitrance by some public authorities and attorneys, as well as a frequent lack of notice to
victims. See Mary L. Boland & Russell Butler, Crime Victims’ Rights: From Illusion to Reality,
24 CRIM. JUST. 4, 8‒9 (2009); Elizabeth N. Jones, The Ascending Role of Crime Victims in PleaBargaining and Beyond, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 100, 129‒36 (2014).
62. S.B. 509, 27th Leg. (Haw. 2013).
63. Victims: Apply for Victim’s Compensation, OHIO ATT’Y GEN. MIKE DEWINE, http://
www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/victimscompensation.aspx/?from=nav.
64. Id.
65. H.B. 492, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013).
66. Id.
67. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 527‒28.
68. State v. Tedesco, 69 A.3d 103, 110 (N.J. 2013).
69. Id. at 106.
70. Id. at 114.
71. For an overview of such organizations, see Help for Crime Victims, THE NAT’L CTR.
FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims [hereinafter
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governmental victim services include counseling, transportation, mediation,
medical services, training and education, financial assistance, crisis
intervention, legal advocacy, legal services, child care, safe houses, and
support groups.72 Well-known, nationwide interest groups, such as Mothers
Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the National Center for Victims of
Crime, are just two of many organizations that help victims construct a victim
impact statement, guide them through the criminal justice process, and provide
free counseling services.73 These groups often work in conjunction with the
state to provide the fastest and most effective services for victims.74
Between non-governmental organizations and state provisions it is clear that
victims’ rights have expanded considerably since the 1960s and will continue
to do so. While discrepancies exist among the states in how vigorously
victims’ rights are enforced, it is clear that they have led the way in creating a
role for, and expanding the rights of, victims during the criminal justice
process.
II. FEDERALISM AND THE PROPOSED VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AMENDMENT
A. History of the Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment
Proposals to amend the U.S. Constitution to codify victims’ rights for all
federal and state judicial proceedings have a long pedigree.75 These proposals
originated from a report by the Task Force on Victims of Crime, which was
convened by President Reagan in 1982.76 In its Final Report, the Task Force
noted that the Bill of Rights has fewer protections for victims than the accused,
and argued that a sentence should be added to the Sixth Amendment providing
rights for victims to be present and heard in criminal prosecutions.77 As
already noted, in 1986, victims’ rights advocates formed NVCAN to lobby for
such a change.78

NCVC]; NACVCB, supra note 30; Victim Resources, NAT’L CRIME VICTIM LAW INST.
https://law.lclark.edu/centers/national_crime_victim_law_institute/for_victims/self_help/.
72. NCVC, supra note 71.
73. Id.
74. See id. For example, in July 2014, California passed SB 978, allowing medical
providers, with a victim’s permission, to contact counseling centers when he or she is transported
to a hospital for a medical evidentiary exam. Prior to the bill, only law enforcement officers
could contact counseling centers on behalf of victims.
75. For useful overviews of the proposed VRA’s history, see Cassell, supra note 3, at
306‒08; Schwartz, supra note 21, at 525.
76. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 114‒15 (1982)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
77. Id. at 114‒15.
78. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 526. See also Victims’ Rights Amendment Introduced,
NAT’L VICTIMS’ CONST. AMENDMENT PASSAGE, http://www.nvcap.org (providing further
information about the NVCAN and its support for the passage of a constitutional amendment).
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By the mid-1990s, the advocates for a constitutional amendment approached
the Clinton Administration and members of both parties in Congress, which
resulted in several versions of the amendment being introduced in the latter
part of the decade.79 Those proposals had eight rights for victims of violent
crime: notice of proceedings, to be present whenever the accused had a right to
be present, to be heard at sentencing, notice of release or escape, a speedy trial,
reasonable victim protection efforts, and notice of these rights.80 The
proposals had numerous co-sponsors, and hearings were held before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, which approved the proposal in 1998.81 However, the
full Senate never voted on the proposal.82
A similar pattern occurred in the 2000s. Again, with bi-partisan support,
numerous co-sponsors, and the Bush Administration’s backing, VRAs similar
to those from the 1990s were introduced in Congress.83 Hearings were held,
and again the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported out a proposed
VRA in 2003.84 Yet again, the full Senate took no action on the proposal, and
no further significant activity on the VRA took place in that decade.85
However, the attention bestowed on the VRA led to the passage of the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) in 2004,86 which established a variety of rights in
federal criminal proceedings that were similar to those in the proposed VRA.
Indeed, the CVRA was the culmination of several earlier federal statutes,
which in various ways established victims’ rights in federal criminal
proceedings.87
Several proposals for a VRA have been introduced in recent years.88 They
were very similar to previously-proposed VRAs, with the one notable
difference being the coverage of all crime victims, not just victims of violent
79. S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong., § 1 (1996).
80. Id.
81. S. REP. NO. 105-409 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Senate Report].
82. For further details on congressional activity on the proposed VRA in the 1990s, see
Cassell, supra note 3, at 307; Schwartz, supra note 21, at 527‒28.
83. S. REP. NO. 108-191, 195‒96 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Senate Report].
84. Id.
85. For further details on congressional activity on the proposed VRA in the 2000s, see
Cassell, supra note 3, at 307‒08.
86. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 101-04, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004). For
discussion of the passage and provisions of the CVRA, see Cassell, supra note 3, at 308‒12.
87. Cassell, supra note 3, at 304‒05 (referring to the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, the
Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and the Victim Rights
Clarification Act of 1997); 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 61‒65 (minority views of Sens.
Leahy, Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer & Durbin) (referring to other federal laws, such as the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, the
Crime Victims With Disabilities Awareness Act of 1998, the Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998,
and the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000).
88. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

920

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:909

crimes.89 However, the renewed proposal did not pass the 113th Congress.90
Perhaps the successes of the victims’ rights movement in the states and by
congressional statute are a contributing factor in the decreased congressional
interest in passing the VRA. The need for the VRA may seem diminished in
light of these other laws.91 Falling crime rates may also play a factor. Still, it
seems unlikely that it will fall from the political agenda, or that there will be no
further efforts to pass the VRA.92
Nonetheless, it is worth asking why, despite what one VRA critic called the
“extraordinary political popularity of victims’ rights,”93 the formidable,
bipartisan support for the VRA, and the considerable activity in Congress, the
VRA has to date never received a full vote in (much less passage by) either
chamber of Congress. No doubt, the sheer difficulty of passing any
constitutional amendment explains much of the reason why. Consider the
recent failure of repeated efforts to pass anti-flag burning amendments, to
balance the budget, or to create term limits for members of Congress, all of
which enjoyed public support like the VRA.94 Another reason is that the VRA
does indeed face formidable opposition. High-level interest groups like the
National Governors’ Association and many state attorneys general supported
the various iterations of the VRA.95 However, the VRA was opposed by an
impressive array of well-known organizations, including the U.S. Judicial
Conference, the lobbying arm of the federal courts, the Conference of Chief
Justices, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
American Civil Liberties Union, and even a variety of victims’ rights
organizations.96 Collectively, these groups advanced many reasons for their
opposition, including that federal or state statutes were preferable to address
89. Cassell, supra note 3, at 313.
90. BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 3, at 731.
91. Id. See also Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim’s Expanding Role in the
System of Public Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims’ Act, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 164, 166‒67 (2010) (stating that victims’ advocates set aside the proposed
constitutional amendment “in the short term” and instead pressed for federal legislation).
92. For example, the 2012 Platform of the Republican Party favorably referred to the VRA
while still not expressly endorsing its passage. See id. The 2012 Democratic Party Platform for
2012 made no reference to the VRA. See The 2012 Democratic National Party Platform, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/09/04/us/politics/20120904DNC-platform.html?_r=0.
93. Robert P. Mosteller, The Unnecessary Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV.
443, 445. See also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 742‒43 (2013) (discussing the legislative success of crime victims
groups, including their unique “ability to generate a wealth of public sympathy, an enormously
powerful weapon in politics, particularly when used in conjunction with media coverage”).
94. 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 3‒6.
95. Id. (summarizing the legislative history of efforts to pass the VRA in the 1990s and
2000s).
96. Id. at 59‒61 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, &
Durbin) (listing these and other groups).
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victims’ rights, that state efforts could prove to be or were already adequate,
and that it was an inappropriate distraction to devote the resources necessary to
convince at least three-fourths of the states to ratify an amendment.97
Presently, the latter rationales seem to have carried the day; however, that does
not necessarily mean the debate has ended.
B. The VRA and the Values of Federalism
Many issues drove the debate over the VRA. The core substantive issue was
the normative one of permitting a new party to participate in criminal
proceedings, and whether that improperly impacted the ability of the accused
to present a defense against the state.98 Related practical issues concerned the
precise language and interpretation of VRA provisions.99 Further discussion of
those arguments is beyond the scope of this Article, as this Article is
principally concerned with the federalism implications of the VRA. This
section of the Article first summarizes and critically evaluates the extant
discussions of the federalism implications of the VRA. It then focuses on the
related aspect of whether and to what extent federal courts would be expected
to enforce state compliance with the VRA requirements.
1. Political Posturing on the VRA and a Functional Analysis of Federalism
Ratification of the VRA would nationalize victims’ rights, which until now
have been left to the vagaries of each state’s law. VRA supporters have always
acknowledged this point, but defended the imposition on the states on various
grounds. The Task Force established by President Reagan argued, though not
elaborately, that a constitutional amendment was necessary as a symbolic
matter and to achieve efficacy, uniformity, and permanence for victims’
rights.100 Later, supporters renewed these arguments during the congressional
debates over the VRA.101 Their principal argument was that victims’ rights
were equally important to the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings—
that is, those enumerated in the Bill of Rights.102 Because most of those rights
had been incorporated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

97. Id. (summarizing these views). For discussions of how prosecutors and other traditional
participants in the criminal justice system may resent the perceived interference by victims, see
Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model,
1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 300‒01, 301 n.43, 322; Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’
Rights? The Nature of the Opposition to Pro-Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S
J. LEGAL COMM. 157, 159‒60 (1992).
98. Cassell, supra note 3, at 304.
99. For examples of the scholarly debate over the VRA, see id. at 301 n.1 (listing scholarly
sources both supporting and criticizing the VRA).
100. FINAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 114‒15.
101. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 754, 764‒75 (2010) (discussing the
Incorporation Doctrine in the Supreme Court and the incorporated rights resulting therefrom).
102. See id. at 767‒68.
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Amendment and thus were binding on the states,103 they argued that victims’
rights should apply to the states in a parallel fashion.104 Only in that way
would victims’ rights be uniformly guaranteed throughout the country, they
argued.105 Supporters also argued that the nationalization of victims’ rights
would not end state developments on the topic because the VRA would permit
states “latitude to accommodate legitimate local interests.”106 Put another way,
they argued, the VRA would establish a floor for victims’ rights that states
could supplement.107
Critics of the VRA countered all of these arguments. They contended that
the quest for uniformity was elusive, as they predicted that implementation of
some of the broad language of the VRA would lead to various interpretations
by different states, and thus create a “patchwork” of protections for victims.108
Critics further argued that there was considerable state activity establishing
victims’ rights, so a federal mandate was unnecessary and could stifle state
innovation in this field.109 Furthermore, they added that the VRA was similar
to an unfunded mandate that could impose enormous implementation costs on
the states.110
In surveying some of these arguments, the most prominent academic
supporter of the VRA, Professor Paul Cassell, argued that the “inconsistency . .
. is . . . breathtaking.”111 He supported this charge by observing that many of
the critics of the VRA were staunch supporters of the Supreme Court’s
federalization of “a whole host of criminal justice issues ranging from the right
to counsel, to Miranda, to death penalty procedures, [and] to search and

103. See id. at 764‒65.
104. Cassell, supra note 3, at 316‒17.
105. See, e.g., id. at 316‒18; 1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at 11‒12; 2003 Senate
Report, supra note 83, at 15‒16. Even some supporters of the VRA nonetheless expressed
concerns about the “federalization of crime and the nationalization of our criminal justice
system.” 1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at 44 (views of Sen. Hatch).
106. Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’ Rights
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 532.
107. Twist & Seiden, supra note 1, at 360‒61.
108. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 546‒47. See also 1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at
68‒71 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, & Kuhl); 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at
71 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & Durbin).
109. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 547; Mosteller, supra note 93, at 444‒45; 1998 Senate
Report, supra note 81, at 69‒71 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, & Kohl). It was
argued that all of the state activity on behalf of victims differentiated the VRA from the
nationalization of rights accomplished by the Fourteenth Amendment, because in the latter
circumstance many states did not protect the rights of the newly freed slaves. 2003 Senate
Report, supra note 83, at 71‒72 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold,
Schumer, & Durbin).
110. 1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at 62‒64 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy,
& Kohl); 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 79‒82, 92 (minority views of Sens. Leahy,
Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & Durbin).
111. Cassell, supra note 106, at 531.
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seizure rules, among many others[.]”112 Cassell’s critique can extend to other
arguments made by the critics. For example, critics of the VRA typically have
supported the nationalization of federal constitutional and statutory rights in a
wide variety of contexts without lodging concerns similar to those they have
about the VRA. Yet Cassell’s critique is more powerful because it also applies
to many of the arguments made by supporters. To his credit, Cassell
acknowledges that many VRA supporters have typically been critics of the
incorporation doctrine.113 This time, though, he waves off the inconsistency,
arguing that “it is unlikely that we will ever retreat from our national
commitment to afford criminal defendants basic rights,” and supporters of the
VRA are now simply asking for “parallel treatment.”114
Inconsistency in addressing federalism issues is not confined to the victims’
rights arena. Generally, most conservatives support the VRA, but are typically
skeptical of federal authority displacing state prerogatives or requiring states to
follow federal mandates without good reasons. On the other hand, most
liberals are critical of the VRA, yet typically support federal laws mandating
national uniformity and state compliance to confront social and political
problems.115 Still, it remains easy to find exceptions to these generalizations in
areas other than the debate over the VRA. For example, consider the
incorporation of the Second Amendment. In McDonald v. City of Chicago,116
the Supreme Court concluded that the right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment applied to the states.117 The interest groups urging the Court to
render this holding, which limited the ability of states to enact gun control
measures, created alliances between traditionally adversarial groups. Thirtyeight state attorneys general, who presumably would favor states’ rights, filed
an amicus curiae brief in favor of this result.118
Similarly, some interest groups that often oppose federal mandates favored
the VRA despite the fact that it limits state innovation via a constitutional
amendment. No less than forty-nine governors and forty-nine state attorneys

112. Id.
113. Id. at 531 n.277 (citing Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—
And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 701‒02
(1988); Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure: State Constitutional
Law and Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 63‒70 (1996)).
114. Id. at 531.
115. See Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY, 37, 37 (2012)
(discussing the skepticism progressives and liberals usually have for federalism).
116. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
117. Id. at 791. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that
the District of Columbia’s ban on handgun possession in the home violated the Second
Amendment).
118. Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of
Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 359‒60 (2012). The attorneys general of three states
filed an amicus brief arguing for the opposite result. Id. at 401.
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general at various times publicly supported VRA proposals in Congress.119
But a lack of consistency in American law and politics is hardly limited to
support or opposition to the VRA. Elected officials, interest groups, and the
public at large are all often result-oriented toward federalism and other issues.
They all may take seemingly counterintuitive positions on federalism issues
due to an electoral advantage on a particular issue, the desire to place
responsibility on the federal government, or the perception that the resolution
of a problem, or lack thereof, in one state has a spillover effect.120 In these
circumstances, a federal, uniform position may provide a resolution.121
The now-standard arguments for or against the VRA are interesting and
important; however, they are largely normative in nature. Specifically, if
someone favors a robust conception of victims’ rights, it would seem that he or
she would support the VRA, with the reverse being true, as well. These
arguments would benefit from a more sustained attention to a functional
analysis of federalism. A rich academic literature in American law, politics,
and economics has developed several rationales for federalism that can be
utilized to measure arguments for or against a proposed federal resolution to a
particular issue.122 These rationales center on the idea that states are better
equipped to fashion solutions that are amenable to their respective
citizenries.123 Citizens and businesses that disagree with particular policies in
a state can vote by moving elsewhere if they disagree vehemently enough. In
this way, states can serve as laboratories of experimentation, which other
states, and indeed the federal government, may follow. On the other hand,
state policies may have negative spillover effects in other states and spark
races-to-the-bottom among states, which suggests that interstate collaboration
is appropriate on an issue, or that a national resolution is beneficial.124
119. 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 3‒4 (governors supported VRA by 49‒1 vote in
1997); Twist & Seiden, supra note 1, at 365 (state attorneys general from forty-eight states, the
U.S. Virgin Islands, and Washington, D.C., supported the VRA in 2004).
120. Solimine, supra note 118, at 381‒89.
121. Id.
122. See sources cited infra note 124.
123. See generally Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389‒405
(1997) (discussing factors for state authority in the federalism context).
124. For discussions and critiques of functionalist justifications for federalism, see DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85‒88 (1995); Jenna Bednar, The Political Science of
Federalism, 7 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 269, 271‒75 (2011); William W. Bratton & Joseph A.
McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a
Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 217‒19 (1997); Friedman, supra note 123, at 378‒412;
Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 2180, 2213‒28 (1998). Cf. Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism and Its
Discontents, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1937, 1941 n.24 (2013) (explaining that interstate spillovers do not
necessarily involve interstate competition, providing as examples pollution across state lines and
cross-state economic effects of racial discrimination). It is difficult to precisely define and apply
such terms as positive and negative externalities, or whether a particular aspect of interstate
competition is a race to the top, a race to the bottom, or perhaps neither. See, e.g., Michael W.
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These factors can apply to analyzing the efficacy of federal or state
regulation of criminal law and procedure.125 On this account, crime negatively
affects states and local communities, and states can respond by, among other
solutions, pursuing policies that encourage criminals and criminal activity to
shift to other states.126 One way to accomplish this goal is by making criminal
investigations and prosecutions easier, as well as increasing jail sentences,
compared to neighboring states.127 In turn, this inter-jurisdictional competition
can be conceptualized as a race-to-the-bottom because negative effects are
exported to other states, and thus states are encouraged to apply increasingly
harsher sanctions or policies than they might otherwise to counter this result.128
State cooperation or federal intervention are two potential paths to counter
these issues.129
Consider how these criteria apply to the development of crime victims’
rights among the states. Establishing and increasing such rights increases the
sanction for criminal activity in several senses because a new actor—the
victim—can enter the criminal justice process, almost always on the side of the
prosecutor. Knowing this, potential criminals may be incentivized to relocate
their illicit activities to other states. In turn, states might be encouraged to
develop victims’ rights to a degree that they might not otherwise. It would

McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1500 (1987)
(book review); Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzbatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal
Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 80 (2014). Nonetheless, useful insights can be gained by
employing such an analysis, and it has thus far not been found in the extant analysis of the
proposed VRA.
125. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Crime, Criminals, and Competitive Crime Control, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1737‒45 (2006); Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice:
Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1864‒71
(2005). However, debate on the efficacy of federal or state control of criminal justice can occur
in mainly consequential terms, giving less weight to the functional critique of federalism.
Compare NICOLE LACEY, THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (2008) (criticizing suboptimal criminal justice policies driven
mainly by local concerns), with Stephanos Bibas, Criminal (In)justice and Democracy in
America, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 134, 137‒38 (2013) (arguing that states and municipalities may
have more incentives to weigh the costs and benefits of criminal justice policies, as compared to
the federal government); Logan, supra note 7, at 88‒103 (asserting that federal statutes, which
since 1994 have heavily regulated state policy toward sex offenders, violate traditional norms of
federalism, including state autonomy and experimentation); Janet Moore, Democracy
Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 543, 550 (arguing that
reforms in criminal procedure should take place at the state level despite hostility or indifference
by the courts).
126. Teichman, supra note 125, at 1838‒39.
127. Id. at 1839‒40.
128. Id. at 1862‒63. Teichman provides examples of how states handle auto-theft rings,
where stolen cars can easily be taken to other states, or “three-strikes laws,” where some evidence
seems to suggest that it displaces criminal activity to other states. Id. at 1843‒48.
129. Id. at 1866.
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seem that these effects are relatively weak. Even if potential criminals engage
in a rigorous ex ante cost-benefit analysis with regard to criminal activity, it is
unlikely that they give much weight to whether or not victims are engaged in
the formal criminal process. The applicable sanctions and the likelihood of a
successful prosecution are likely to be more important. The role of victims is
not irrelevant; however, it likely plays a secondary role regarding the
possibility of criminals relocating to other states.130 States are typically
concerned with victims who live or are victimized in their own state.
Regarding victims’ rights, then, “[g]iven all the other pressures that bear on
criminal justice policy, interjurisdictional competition to displace crime does
not appear to be a major force that shapes the system.”131
The application of functional justifications for federalism shows that the
proposed VRA is not appropriate. As developed in Part I, all states have
established victims’ rights, but the kinds of rights and the level of their
enforcement differs among the states. Uniformity does not exist, and it can be
argued that some states enforce victims’ rights more effectively than others.
The Appendix highlights some of these important and varying differences
between states.
However, it does not follow that the VRA is the appropriate solution for
these inconsistencies. The level of protection of victims’ rights appears to
have relatively minimal interstate effects, and in particular few, if any,
interstate externalities. The benefits and costs of victims’ rights seem largely
internalized within each state. Thus, to the extent states compete to increase
victims’ rights, it appears to be a race-to-the-top. States may have a variety of
reasons, from mundane budgetary concerns to apprehensions about changing
traditional criminal procedure, to not adopt or enforce a panoply of victims’
rights. Conversely, other states might consider it good policy and politics to
adopt and vigorously enforce victims’ rights. This experimentation should
play out on a state-by-state basis, and as the state laws and practices survey in
Part I demonstrates, states have continued to experiment. Consequently,
federal intervention through the VRA or in other ways, at least at present, is
unnecessary.
2. Federal Court Enforcement of the VRA
Another way federalism concerns arose during the debates over the proposed
VRA was how federal courts may enforce its provisions against the states.132
Some states allow crime victims to file civil suits for money damages,133 but
no proposed version of the VRA has ever contained such a provision. The
130. Perhaps this conclusion would change as victims’ rights become more established in
state criminal procedure and victims come to exercise their rights more vigorously.
131. Samuel R. Gross, Jurisdictional Competition in Criminal Justice: How Much Does It
Really Happen?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1725, 1732 (2006).
132. See Mosteller, supra note 93, at 451.
133. Cassell, supra note 3, at 333‒34, 334 n.219; supra Part I.A.
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reasons for this omission were avowedly pragmatic because such suits raise
potentially complex issues, including how such an action might affect pleabargaining, as well as other aspects of the criminal process.134 The language of
the VRA did not mandate a damages remedy, and its availability, supporters
said, was for Congress and the states to decide.135
However, that left unresolved the issue of how VRA requirements might be
enforced against states by actions for declaratory or injunctive relief in federal
court.136 The silence of the VRA on this issue, and the express exception for
only damages actions, would seem to leave open the possibility of such
relief.137 Supporters of the VRA seem to acknowledge this point, but were
untroubled by any federalism implications because, as they observed, other
provisions of the Bill of Rights are routinely enforced by criminal defendants
as defenses to state prosecutions.138
In contrast, critics of the VRA expressed great concern regarding possible
federal court supervision of state criminal procedures in order to enforce the
requirements of the VRA.139 They emphasized that, not unlike the long history
of prison reform litigation, injunctive suits in federal court, especially those
brought as class actions, would impose potentially enormous monetary costs
on a state and intrude on the daily operations of its criminal justice system.140
Indeed, they further observed, the conference of state chief justices opposed
the adoption of the VRA for this reason.141
These respective arguments contain inconsistencies, some of which could be
described as breathtaking.142 Typically, most conservative supporters of the
134. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 333‒34.
135. Id. at 333; 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 84. According to VRA supporters, a
victim could not file a damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce rights guaranteed under
the VRA. Cassell, supra note 3, at 334. Under existing law, courts have also rejected § 1983
damage actions by victims against public officials for alleged failures to protect existing rights.
See, e.g., Pusey v. Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657‒58 (6th Cir. 1993).
136. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 536. Such actions could also be brought in state court, but
they would not present the federalism issues addressed in this article.
137. Id.
138. Cassell, supra note 3, at 335; Twist & Seiden, supra note 1, at 362.
139. 1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at 71‒72 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy,
& Kohl); 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 92‒93 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy,
Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & Durbin).
140. 1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at 71‒72 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy,
& Kohl); 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 93 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy,
Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & Durbin).
141. 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 92‒93 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy,
Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & Durbin).
142. However, not all of the arguments are inconsistent. For example, Republican Senator
Fred Thompson opposed the VRA because of its intrusion on state prerogatives, including the
likelihood of federal court supervision of state criminal proceedings. 1998 Senate Report, supra
note 81, at 47‒49. Likewise, Professor Robert Mosteller, a critic of the VRA, did not seem
troubled by the prospect of federal court intervention, and indeed conceded that it would increase
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VRA would otherwise be critical of federal court injunctive actions that
monitor state institutions such as schools, prisons, or mental health facilities,
often at great cost to the state, to enforce compliance with federal
constitutional rights.143 Critics charge that such actions effectively vest
executive and legislative power in federal judges, far beyond the scope of
power traditionally held by courts.144 Conversely, most liberal critics of the
VRA have embraced such federal court actions in other contexts as necessary
to compel recalcitrant states to follow federal constitutional norms.145
If the VRA were adopted, and declaratory or injunctive relief actions were
permitted and inevitably filed, it is likely that such actions would neither be as
uncontroversial as the VRA’s supporters suggest, nor as disruptive as its critics
argue. The history of similar institutional reform litigation in federal courts
indicates the likelihood of this conclusion.146 Injunctive actions in federal
court against state action in general, and institutional reform litigation in
particular, have long been controversial.147 While such actions were especially
and successfully utilized in the Civil Rights Movement, not all federal judges
embraced them, and Congress has passed legislation limiting the ability of
litigants to seek injunctive relief.148 Depending on various factors, including
local conditions, the state institution involved, and the scope of the injunctive
relief sought, such actions have sometimes not been especially controversial.149
Instead, structural reform litigation has, on occasion, “stabilized as a form of
litigation with a range of generally accepted remedies in a few leading cases
and imitated elsewhere.”150
A similar pattern may follow if federal courts were called upon to enforce
the VRA. All states have constitutional or statutory protections for victims’
rights, so being required to follow the broad language of rights enumerated in
the VRA would not present a monumental shift. States would argue that they
are already complying with the VRA. No doubt, some victims would disagree

the “effectiveness of victims’ rights,” while still ultimately opposing it. Mosteller, supra note 93,
at 451.
143. See supra notes 139‒42 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN THE GOVERNMENT 150‒61 (2003).
145. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
146. For an excellent overview, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural
Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387 (2007).
147. S. Gene Fendler, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Criminal Proceedings:
From Young to Younger, 32 LA. L. REV. 601, 601 (1972).
148. Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 146, at 1395‒97, 1408‒12 (discussing Congressional
restrictions and federal judicial behavior).
149. Id. at 1411‒12.
150. Id. at 1412. For similar conclusions, see Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions
Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 565 (2006).
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and argue that the state law provisions, either facially or as-applied, are
deficient. In turn, they might file a lawsuit in federal court seeking an order to
force full state compliance with the mandates of the VRA. The outcome of
these lawsuits would inevitably vary from state to state, but it is difficult to
believe that there would be endless and massive intrusions by federal courts.
Most federal judges and state officials would not have the appetite for such
litigation. Rather, such litigation would probably lead to some reforms in
states as needed, and sooner or later recede into the background.151
C. The Fate of the Victims’ Rights Amendment
Calling for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution is no small task. The
adoption of the VRA is unjustified based on the values of federalism. While
federal courts would likely adopt a modest, incremental approach in enforcing
the VRA, should it be enacted, the VRA should not be implemented at all. The
benefits and burdens of expanding or diminishing victims’ rights are largely
confined to the states, and a uniform federal law is unnecessary. Nonetheless,
support for the VRA will likely continue. Many supporters will disagree with
the assessments of this article on federalism grounds and conclude that the
VRA’s apparent uniformity is necessary. Others may support the VRA as a
matter of symbolic politics. Consequently, the proposed adoption of the VRA
is unlikely to fade from the policy agenda.
III. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Absent the VRA, federal courts would still have a significant role in
adjudicating and enforcing victims’ rights established by federal statutes with
regard to federal criminal actions in those courts. Victims’ rights established
by state law would be resolved primarily in state courts. Each sovereign would
operate on its own terms. An exception to this strict dichotomy occurs in the
adjudication of federal habeas corpus actions in federal court.152 In those
actions, federal courts review claims by prisoners that their state criminal
convictions violated their federal constitutional rights.153 This section outlines
the, at times, complicated and contentious history of federal habeas actions,

151. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
781, 828‒30 (2006) (suggesting that structural reform litigation regarding “criminal justice
institutions” could be effected through institutional injunctions).
152. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 410 (1963). Another exception would be the infrequent
instances when the U.S. Supreme Court directly reviews state court adjudications of victims’
rights. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (holding that the state did not
violate the Eighth Amendment in permitting a victim impact statement in the sentencing phase of
a capital case).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). This article does not address the other type of habeas actions
that can be brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 regarding claims of prisoners in
federal custody.
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and then examines the curious history of the enforcement of victims’ rights in
federal habeas litigation.
Shortly after the Civil War, Congress statutorily granted federal judges the
authority to hear constitutional claims from persons convicted in state court
seeking a writ of habeas corpus.154 That authority was narrowly construed for
decades because it was often limited to circumstances where the state court
lacked personal jurisdiction, thus resulting in few writs being granted.155 This
narrow application ceased during the Warren Court for two reasons. First, the
Court incorporated many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights concerning
criminal proceedings to the states, thus expanding the list of potential
constitutional violations in state courts.156 Second, the Court expanded the
procedural ambit of the federal habeas statutes by permitting writs to be issued
even when claims had not been fully presented to state courts.157 The
conventional wisdom for the change is that the Court was driven by the
perception that state judges and institutions were incapable of vigorously
protecting the constitutional rights of the accused.158
These developments, permitting federal judges to superintend state criminal
procedures, were very controversial on and off the Court. On the Court, more
conservative decisions from the Burger and Rehnquist Courts curtailed the
Warren Court’s expansive decisions by highlighting the costs of habeas, such
as the value of finality in state court convictions, the quality of state court
judging, and the balance of federalism.159 Off the Court, the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) and other groups lobbied the Court
in favor of those results and Congress to amend the habeas statutes to codify
and extend these more restrictive interpretations.160 Those efforts culminated
in 1996 with the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

154. Katy J. Harriger, The Federalism Debate in the Transformation of Federal Habeas
Corpus, 27 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 1, 3 (1997).
155. History of the Federal Judiciary: Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, FED.
JUD. CTR., www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction_habeas.html (last visited July 25,
2015).
156. Harriger, supra note 154, at 3.
157. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 438 (holding that habeas petitions could be heard in cases where
the petition had not been presented in state court, unless the prisoner deliberately bypassed state
procedures).
158. For overviews of these developments, see NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN,
HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT
WRIT 6‒11, 48‒60 (2011); Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in
State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 798‒805 (2009).
159. KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 158, at 61‒66; MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L.
WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 120‒21
(1999).
160. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at 121. For further discussion of the postWarren Court debate over habeas corpus, see Harriger, supra note 154, at 9‒20; Larry W. Yackle,
The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2349‒73 (1993).
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(AEDPA).161 This law creates a one-year statute of limitations to bring habeas
petitions after exhausting state remedies, speeds up the protracted litigation of
habeas suits in capital cases; and provides that habeas relief can only be
awarded when a state court acts contrary to “clearly established federal law,”
as determined by the Supreme Court.162
The lengthy and contentious debate over the scope and application of federal
habeas can obscure how difficult it is for a state prisoner to convince a federal
judge to issue a writ. The changes in law effectuated by the Warren Court
likely encouraged prisoners to file petitions in U.S. District Courts. Petitions
rose from 560 filed in 1950, to 5,000 annually in the 1960s, to 9,000 by 1970,
and to about 15,000 today.163 However, this spike in the number of habeas
applications was not correlative with the number granted. Even at the zenith of
the Warren Court, federal judges granted only three to four percent of the
petitions filed.164 Only one to two percent of petitions were granted in
subsequent decades.165 The subset of petitions filed in cases where the death
penalty was available presents a different picture, with up to forty percent
being granted.166 The grant rate for the noncapital subset of petitions thus falls
below one percent.167 The latter figure is due to the more complicated
substantive and procedural law that governs capital cases, coupled with their
higher stakes and generally being more vigorously argued.168 There is a robust
debate over what accounts for the low rate of petitioner success, especially in
non-capital cases169 and what can be done to change it, if anything.170
161. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996), codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code.
162. For discussion of the provisions of AEDPA, see Hoffman & King, supra note 158, at
805‒06.
163. KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 158, at 60; SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at
122. See also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1943 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(providing similar statistics).
164. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at 122.
165. Id. at 122‒23.
166. Id. at 123.
167. Id. at 122‒24.
168. Hoffman & King, supra note 158, at 821‒22 (discussing differences between capital and
noncapital habeas cases).
169. Cf. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at 124 (arguing that the low rate indicates
that state criminal trials do not systematically undermine the full and fair adjudication of the
federal constitutional rights of the accused); KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 158, at 87‒101
(stating that the low rate of petitions is due to most noncapital prisoners not being in state custody
long enough to exhaust remedies and subsequently file a petition).
170. For a variety of perspectives, see SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at 126‒27
(arguing that habeas corpus should still exist, but generally be limited to a focus on the process
due to the accused to raise their rights); HOFFMAN & KING, supra note 158, at 796‒98 (arguing
that habeas corpus should be abandoned for noncapital cases, except for claims of actual
innocence, and for capital cases, coupled with a federal initiative to improve state defense
services); John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapital
Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435 (2011) (taking issue with
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Still, this narrative lacks any reference to the victims’ rights movement. One
explanation for this absence may be because the leaders of that movement
were not particularly concerned with federal habeas litigation.171 Likewise, it
appears that most victims were primarily interested in the resolution of the
original criminal trials and less so in post-trial proceedings, including habeas
litigation.172 Indeed, both supporters and critics of the VRA, at least in the
2003 iteration, took pains to emphasize that victims’ rights laws would not
apply in federal habeas proceedings.173 Perhaps this reticence is due to the fact
that victims were rarely involved in habeas cases. Alternatively, it might be
because almost all federal habeas litigation is resolved on a paper record and
evidentiary hearings are rarely held.174 Thus, there is no forum for victims to
speak their mind on any issue in open court, though they could presumably still
submit a brief or some other written statement.
Perhaps reflecting this reticence, the CVRA, passed in 2004 in the wake of
the abandonment of the effort to pass the VRA in 2003, made no reference to
victims’ rights in habeas cases.175 However, that changed two years later with
the passage of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
(AWCPSA).176 One minor provision of that wide-ranging law expressly
establishes victims’ rights in federal habeas litigation.177 It is similar, but not
identical, to the list of victims’ rights in federal criminal trials established by

Hoffman & King’s arguments); Aziz Z. Hug, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
519 (2014) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s habeas jurisprudence is more coherent than often
thought, and, as properly understood, is an instrument for sorting out cases warranting either less
or more judicial attention).
171. 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 41.
172. Id.
173. Cf. 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 41 (observing that “the administration of
criminal justice exception [found in the 2003 proposal] covers habeas corpus filings and
proceedings, including those pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254”); id. at 107 (minority views of Sens.
Leahy, Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & Durbin) (arguing that “the exercise of [victims’]
rights would be terribly disruptive of a proceeding in a habeas corpus” case).
174. KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 158, at 79‒80. See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct.
1388, 1413 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that evidentiary hearings are held in only 4
of every 1,000 noncapital cases, and 9.5 of every 100 capital cases). It appears that the low rate
of hearings in federal court might become even lower after the Cullen decision, which held that
relief under AEDPA would usually be based solely upon the state court record, as opposed to
examining new evidence that might arise in a later evidentiary hearing. For further discussion,
see Hug, supra note 170 at 536‒38.
175. Victims’ Rights: Crime Victims’ Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.
gov/usao/briefing_room/vw/rights.html (last updated July 8, 2015).
176. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 616
(2006). The habeas provision is in Title II, § 212. For an overview of the AWCPSA, see Wayne
A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past, Present and Future, 34
NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIVIL CONFINEMENT 3 (2008).
177. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 616
(2006).
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the CVRA. The AWCPSA states that victims have “right[s] not to be excluded
from any such public court proceeding,” “to be reasonably heard at any public
proceeding in the district court,” “to proceedings free from unreasonable
delay,” and “to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s
dignity and privacy.”178 Notably, the AWCPSA does not include a right of
notification to the victim, though state law might still require victim
notification of federal proceedings.179
The rationale for including the provisions on victim participation in habeas
proceedings in the AWCPSA is unclear from the legislative history, which
makes only passing reference to these habeas provisions.180 Presumably they
are related to concerns with those convicted of crimes against juveniles
eventually seeking habeas relief in an attempt to set aside state trial results.181
The habeas provisions of the CVRA have been subject to relatively little
adjudication. The most prominent discussion is the decision of the Fourth
Circuit in Brandt v. Gooding,182 a habeas case with a relatively unusual set of
facts.183 The habeas petitioner had previously sued his former lawyer for legal
malpractice in state court.184 The court found the plaintiff guilty of criminal
contempt for introducing a fraudulent letter into those proceedings.185 The
conviction was affirmed and the former plaintiff, now a state prisoner, filed a
writ of habeas corpus in U.S. District Court.186 The petitioner moved to
intervene in that proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 to file a
memorandum to correct what she saw as misstatements of fact made by the
habeas petitioner when the latter moved for summary judgment.187 She sought
to utilize the CVRA provisions permitting victims in state proceedings to

178. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(2)(A) (2012) (referencing rights found in section 3771(a)(3)‒(4),
(7)‒(8)).
179. CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE: ADAM WALSH CHILD
PROTECTION AND SAFETY ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 20 (2007).
180. AWCPSA was enacted without committee hearings or other parts of the typical
legislative process, as part of its fast-tracking through Congress, thus leaving minimal legislative
history. See Logan, supra note 7, at 52, 112‒13.
181. DOYLE, supra note 179, at 21. Earlier proposed legislation that culminated in the
AWCPSA placed severe restrictions on the ability of state prisoners convicted of killing a child to
pursue federal habeas relief, and also permitted victims to participate in those habeas proceedings.
E.g., Children’s Safety Act, H.R. 3132, 109th Cong. § 303 (2005). The former provisions proved
controversial and are not in the AWCPSA. The legislative history of the earlier proposals only
briefly refers to victims’ rights in the habeas provisions. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-218, pt.1, (2005).
182. 636 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2011).
183. Id. at 127.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 130.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 131‒32.
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intervene in federal habeas proceedings.188 The district judge denied the
motion to intervene, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.189
Petitioner argued that the CVRA permitted her to intervene, thus granting
her intervention under Rule 24(a)(1).190 Alternatively, she contended that the
CVRA independently granted a right to intervene to vindicate her “right to be
reasonably heard at any public proceeding . . . involving release . . . .”191 The
court dismissed the first argument because the CVRA does not guarantee a
right to intervene.192 Rejecting the petitioner’s second argument, however,
proved more challenging for the court.193 The court agreed that a habeas
petition initiated a “public proceeding” under the CVRA.194 Because most
habeas cases are resolved on the pleadings and a paper record, the court
continued, a crime victim could submit documents to be “heard” at the public
proceeding.195
However, the court concluded that a formal intervention did not need to be
granted to vindicate that right.196 The legislative history of the CVRA, the
court stated, does not demand that “reasonably heard” be the equivalent of an
“in-person right to be heard.”197 The court continued that in circumstances
such as here, where the district judge ruled on the petition based on a paper
record, the right to be “reasonably heard” was vindicated when the district
judge construed her motion to intervene as an amicus curiae brief.198 Such a
brief, the court concluded, provided petitioner with “a full and fair opportunity,
under the CVRA, to provide information and communicate her views to the
court.”199
Other courts have followed Brandt,200 as it reached the correct result. Most
habeas cases are decided on a paper record, and it would be unnecessary in
almost all other circumstances to schedule a hearing solely for the victim to
speak in court. Because habeas cases are akin to appellate litigation, in that
habeas courts do not hold trials de novo, the interests of the victim to be heard

188. Id. at 131.
189. Id. at 132.
190. Id. at 136. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) (providing for the “unconditional right to
intervene”).
191. Brandt, 636 F.3d at 136. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2012).
192. Brandt, 636 F.3d at 136.
193. Id. at 137.
194. Id.
195. Id. The court earlier assumed, without deciding, that the attorney was a “crime victim
within the meaning of the [CVRA].” Id. at 136.
196. Id. at 137.
197. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. Id.
199. Id. (footnote omitted).
200. E.g., United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, SA, 688 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam).
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would usually be satisfied by the opportunity to file an amicus brief.201 Of
course, the distinction between an intervener and an amicus is readily apparent.
The former assumes all of the powers and responsibilities of a party, and can
engage in discovery, file motions, formally participate in all hearings, and in
some form have a veto over some decisions made by other parties.202 In
contrast, the filer’s power is exhausted when the amicus brief is filed.203 That
brief may be eloquent and persuasive, but it cannot be buttressed by further
legal involvement of the victim.204 Nonetheless, the right to be heard under the
CVRA is conditional, as it must be “reasonable,” and, therefore, in most
habeas cases the opportunity to file an amicus brief encompasses that right.205
Brandt tailored its holding to the circumstances of that case, implying that a
different view might be appropriate in other habeas cases.206 For example, if
there was an evidentiary hearing, the victim may be afforded an opportunity to
speak in person. It is unlikely that the victim would be a formal party in such a
scenario, as Gooding sought in Brandt,207 but rather an interested witness.
This would supplement or replace the opportunity to file an amicus brief.
Whether in-person or by amicus brief, the victim could address legal issues and
also, if desired, the impact of the crime on his or her life. It might seem odd
initially to permit a victims’ impact statement in a federal habeas

201. Cf. United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 985‒86 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing
complications caused by intervention of crime victims at either trial or appellate stages).
202. Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims’ Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237, 254–
55 (2008).
203. Id.
204. Id. (comparing participating as an amicus curiae or an intervener).
205. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 323‒26 (discussing what the “right to be heard”
encompasses); Blondel, supra note 202, at 270‒72 (skeptical of increasing victims’ rights,
arguing that the right to be “reasonably heard” under the CVRA should be read narrowly, but also
include the ability to file an amicus brief).
206. Another way for victims to participate in habeas cases would be if more of those cases
settled out of court. While the vast majority of criminal cases settle before trial, mostly via pleabargaining, a settlement at the habeas stage almost never takes place. Nonetheless, de facto
settlements can occur when a U.S. Magistrate Judge recommends the grant of a habeas petition to
a U.S. District Judge. At that point, the habeas petitioner may plead guilty to a lesser charge and
withdraw the habeas petition. Email from J. Michael R. Merz, U.S. Magistrate Judge, S.D. Ohio,
to author (August 26, 2013, 8:21 EST) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Merz email]. There are
likely several reasons for the dearth of formal settlements, including the lack of counsel for the
petitioner in most noncapital habeas cases, the lack of incentives to compromise given the costs
already incurred, and the difficulty associated with determining what court has authority to revise
a sentence. KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 158, at 82‒83. See also Anup Malani, Habeas
Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 31‒38 (2006). Despite these obstacles, Professor Malani has
argued that there can and should be more attempts to settle habeas cases. Id. at 39‒51. Professor
Malani makes no specific reference to victims being involved in the settlement regime he
advocates. However, should such a culture of settlement in habeas cases arise, victims can and
should be consulted by appropriate counsel regarding the propriety of a settlement.
207. Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 136 (4th Cir. 2011).
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proceeding.208 This might be so because at the habeas stage the court is not
pondering the appropriate sentence after a conviction,209 but instead only the
presence of constitutional errors in previous proceedings. Yet such a statement
should be permitted, even if it is not directly applicable to the factual and legal
issues present in the proceeding.210
There are several reasons supporting this assertion. First, the habeas
jurisdiction of the federal courts presents an acute problem of federalism. It is
a conspicuous exception to the usual steps of civil or criminal litigation where,
with rare exceptions, parties get only one chance to fully litigate their case.
Thus, federal habeas jurisdiction is an exception to res judicata, so a convicted
state prisoner has the opportunity to litigate his conviction again, at least
regarding federal constitutional issues, even after his trial has ended and
appeals have been exhausted.211 This intrusion into the finality of state
criminal procedures has resulted in considerable controversy and driven much
of the change in habeas procedures since the end of the Warren Court.212
However, an all-or-nothing response to this intrusion is unnecessary. A
middle ground between a total repeal of habeas and a robust revival of Warren
Court principles would be to acknowledge the careful balancing act of federal
judges adjudicating state criminal procedures and to show a willingness to
weigh the unique factors of each case.213 One way to accomplish this goal is to
be open-minded to the participation of victims in habeas proceedings, not only
through amicus briefs on legal issues, but also through oral or written victim
impact statements.214 A victim impact statement in a habeas proceeding may
208. See DOYLE, supra note 179, at 20 (footnote omitted) (“[T]he usual form of a victim’s
being heard, the victim impact statement, has no real place in a habeas proceeding.”).
209. See BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 3, at 567 (explaining that a VIS in state or
federal court is typically made at the sentencing stage).
210. It is not entirely uncommon for victims to be present during hearings in federal habeas
cases, though they may not make statements, even when invited. There are also other instances,
besides Brandt v. Gooding, of victims being permitted to participate in limited ways in federal
habeas proceedings. For example, in Gillispie v. Timmerman-Cooper, No. 3:09-cv-471, 2013
WL 526481 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2013), the court denied the State’s Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal after it had granted a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at *6. The state government filed a notice
of appeal, and the court subsequently scheduled a bond hearing, at which the victims were set to
testify. Merz email, supra note 206. Reportedly the victims would have contested the court’s
holding, which was based in part on questioning of their eyewitness testimony. Id. The hearing
was later cancelled and the victims’ testimony was not taken. Id.
211. See Harriger, supra note 154, at 3.
212. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at 125 (explaining the symbolic costs of habeas,
despite the fact that states tend to win the vast majority of habeas cases).
213. For arguments to modify federal habeas corpus based on changing institutional needs,
see KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 158, at 167‒71; SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at
124‒27.
214. This article does not argue that federal law should formally incorporate state victims’
rights law on this matter, or that federal courts should be bound by state law. Rather, it only
asserts that federal courts should acknowledge the universal adoption of victims’ rights in all
states when considering the appropriate scope of victim involvement in habeas cases. Cf. Wayne
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be largely, if not wholly, of symbolic value. However, most proponents of the
victims’ rights movement would likely support this as a tool to empower a
traditionally ignored party to criminal proceedings. Permitting a victim to
appear in federal habeas proceedings in these ways would acknowledge that
federal decision makers are not oblivious to the interests and sovereignty of the
state.215
IV. CONCLUSION
Many discussions of rights in the United States proceed on the assumption
that the Constitution and the branches of government have the lead roles in
developing rights, often in the face of passive or recalcitrant states. Still, over
the years developments of victims’ rights in criminal procedure turns that
assumption on its head. For several decades, states have taken the lead in the
victims’ rights revolution, and the federal government has followed that lead
by passing legislation that supports victims’ rights. All of these developments
raise implications for federalism. Victims’ rights have received extended and
continued, if varied, attention in the fifty states. For that reason, and because it
would on balance not serve the values of federalism, Congress should not pass
the VRA. States can continue to serve as laboratories on victims’ rights, but
nationalization of those rights through the VRA is unnecessary and
inappropriate. Nonetheless, whether or not the VRA is passed, federalism
concerns argue in favor of federal courts recognizing a robust version of
victims’ rights when considering habeas corpus petitions from prisoners
challenging their state court convictions. The development of victims’ rights
at the federal and state levels thus does not occur in completely separate
spheres, and would benefit by accounting for its implications to federalism
principles.

A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243 (2010) (discussing the
application of state law in federal criminal proceedings).
215. Cf. Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE
L.J. 2236, 2317‒18 (2014) (arguing that federal criminal proceedings will be more legitimate if
the federal system pays more deference to local practices in criminal justice).
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APPENDIX216
STATE

STATE
CONS’T
AMEND.

VICTIM
ALLOWED
TO BE

PRESENT
AT PAROLE
HEARING
Ala.

✓

✓

VIS
PRESENTATION
FORMAT AT
PAROLE

FILING
LIMIT

Oral or written
statement

1 year

STATE
COMPENSATION
MAX LIMIT
(IN USD)

15,000

216. For statues that specifically apply to rules governing victim input and presence at parole
hearings, see ALA. CODE §§ 15-22-36(3)(i), 15-23-79 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 314411(H) (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1113(a) (2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3043 (West
2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-302.5 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9416 (2014); FLA.
STAT. § 960.001(e) (2015); FLA. CONST. ART. I, § 16; GA. CODE ANN. § 17-17-13 (2014); 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/10 (West 2015); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-40-5-1 to 35-40-13-5 (West
2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-3 (West 2015); IOWA CODE § 915.18 (2014); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3717(K)(h) (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.530 (West 2015); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PRO. § 11-403 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B § 3(b), (p) (West 2015);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.771 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-43 (2014); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 595.209(1)(6) (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-202, 46-24-212 (West
2015); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-k(II)(t) (2015); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:4B-44 (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-25(E) (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE
§12.1-34-02(18) (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.12 (West 2015); OKLA. CONST. art. II, §
34(a); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11-201 (West 2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-6 (2015); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1560 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-28C-1(10), 24-15-3 (2015);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-103(2) (2014); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §56.02(7) (West 2015);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-4 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5305(c)(1) (2015); WASH.
REV. CODE § 7.69.032(2)(a) (2015); WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1) (2014). See also SUSAN C.
KINNEVY & JOEL M. CAPLAN, NATIONAL SURVEYS OF STATE PAROLE BOARDS: MODELS OF
SERVICE DELIVERY (2008); Crime Victims Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2015); IDAHO ADMIN.
CODE § 50.01.01.300 (2014); Parole/Pardon Board Hearings, LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY &
CORR., http://www.doc.la.gov/pages/victim-services/parolepardon-board-hearings/ (last visited
Aug. 17, 2015); State of Alaska Department of Corrections Policies and Procedures, Chapter:
Victim’s Right, Subject: Victim Notification, STATE OF ALASKA (2012), http://www.correct.state.
ak.us/pnp/pdf/1000.01.pdf; Maryland Parole Commission FAQ Index, Victims Rights Related to
Parole Hearings, DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERV., http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/
aboutdpscs/FAQmpc.shtml#answ26 (last visited Aug. 17, 2015); Information for Crime Victims,
STATE OF N.J., STATE PAROLE BD., http://www.state.nj.us/parole/victim.html (last visited Aug.
17, 2015); Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, https://
www.parole.ny.gov/faq.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2015); Attendance at Hearings, OKLA.
PARDONS & PAROLE BD., http://www.ok.gov/ppb/Parole_Process/Hearing_Process/Hearing_
Attendance/index.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2015); Victim Information Guide, OR. BD. OF
PAROLE & POST-PRISON SUPERVISION, http://www.oregon.gov/BOPPPS/pages/victims_guide.
aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2015); Victims Services, VA. DEP’T OF CORR., http://vadoc.virginia.
gov/victim/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015); What You Need to Know About Open Parole Bd.
Hearings, W.V. PAROLE BD., http://www.paroleboard.wv.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/
Victim%27s%20Rights.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2015); Victim Input, WYO. BD. OF PAROLE,
http://boardofparole.wy.gov/victimservices/victimappearances.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
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STATE
CONS’T
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VICTIM
ALLOWED
TO BE
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VIS
PRESENTATION
FORMAT AT
PAROLE

FILING
LIMIT

STATE
COMPENSATION
MAX LIMIT
(IN USD)

Written
statement

2 years

Oral or written
statement
Can meet with
the parole
board prior to
the hearing at a
victim impact
meeting;
written
statement
Oral or written
statement;
through legal
counsel,
videocassette,
or
audiocassette
recording
Written
statement

2 years

40,000; 80,000
in homicides
with multiple
victims
25,000

Alaska

✓

PRESENT
AT PAROLE
HEARING
✓

Ariz.

✓

✓

Ark.

-

-

Cal.

✓

✓

Colo.

✓

-

Conn.

✓

✓

Oral or written
statement

2 years

Del.

-

✓

Oral or written
statement

1 year

Fla.

✓

✓

Oral or written
statement

1 year

1 year

3 years

1 year

10,000; 25,000
for catastrophic
injuries

63,000

20,000 (each
district may set
a lower
minimum)
15,000; 20,000
in cases of
homicide
25,000; 50,000
when injuries
are total and
permanent.
15,000; 30,000
for catastrophic
injuries
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STATE
CONS’T
AMEND.

VICTIM
ALLOWED
TO BE

Ga.

-

PRESENT
AT PAROLE
HEARING
-

Haw.

-

-

Idaho

✓

✓

Ill.

✓

-

Ind.

✓

✓

Iowa

-

✓

Kan.

✓

-

Ky.

-

✓
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VIS
PRESENTATION
FORMAT AT
PAROLE

FILING
LIMIT

STATE
COMPENSATION
MAX LIMIT
(IN USD)

Written
statement
Written or oral
statement

1 year

25,000

18
months

1 year

10,000; 20,000
if only medical
expenses
claimed
25,000

2 years

27,000

180 days

15,000

2 years

No overall limit;
maximum for
each expense

2 years

25,000

5 years

25,000

Written or oral
statement
Written
statement;
videotape;
recording
Oral or written
statement;
videotape or
audio
recording
Oral statement
given by
victim or
counsel
Can speak to
the parole
board at a
“Public
Comment
Session”
scheduled once
a month in one
of three cities;
written
statement; via
telephone for a
verbal
comment
Written
statement
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STATE
CONS’T
AMEND.

La.

✓

Me.

-

Md.

✓

Mass.

-

Mich.

✓

Minn.

-

VICTIM
ALLOWED
TO BE

PRESENT
AT PAROLE
HEARING
- 217

No parole
board
Only in the
case of an
open
hearing

Only
allowed in
certain
cases
-

No parole
board
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VIS
PRESENTATION
FORMAT AT
PAROLE

FILING
LIMIT

STATE
COMPENSATION
MAX LIMIT
(IN USD)

Via telephone
from the office
of the local
district
attorney, prior
to the hearing
No parole
board
Written
statement; may
meet with the
parole
commissioner
prior to the
hearing
Written
statement

1 year

10,000; 25,000
when injuries
are total and
permanent

3 years

15,000

3 years

45,000

3 years

25,000

1 year

25,000

3 years

50,000

Written or oral
statement (in
person or over
the telephone)
given to a
member of the
board prior to
the hearing
No parole
board

217. Louisiana does not have a physical parole board hearing. In other words, even the
offender does not meet in-person with the board—all communication is done via teleconference.
The board members are at the headquarters in Baton Rouge while the offender testifies on the
phone from the closest state prison or parish facility. Victims can testify, but they must go to
either Baton Rouge, where the parole Board is meeting, or to the institution where the offender
will testify. Parole/Pardon Board Hearings, LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR., http://www.
doc.la.gov/pages/victim-services/parolepardon-board-hearings/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
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STATE
CONS’T
AMEND.

VICTIM
ALLOWED
TO BE

Miss.

✓

PRESENT
AT PAROLE
HEARING
-

Mo.

✓

✓

Mont.

✓

✓

Neb.

✓

✓

Nev.

✓

✓

N.H.

-

✓
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VIS
PRESENTATION
FORMAT AT
PAROLE

FILING
LIMIT

STATE
COMPENSATION
MAX LIMIT
(IN USD)

Written or
recorded
statement
Oral statement;
written
statement;
telephone call
to the board
member
convening the
hearing, prior
to the hearing;
audiotape;
videotape;
personal
meeting with a
board member
prior to the
hearing
Written
statement

3 years

20,000

2 years

25,000

1 year

25,000

Written or oral
statement
Oral or written
statement;
interview with
a
commissioner
of the board
prior to the
hearing
Written or oral
statement

2 years

10,000

1 year

35,000

1 year

25,000
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STATE
CONS’T
AMEND.

VICTIM
ALLOWED
TO BE

N.J.

✓

PRESENT
AT PAROLE
HEARING
-

N.M.

✓

✓

N.Y.

-

-

N.C.

✓

✓
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VIS
PRESENTATION
FORMAT AT
PAROLE

FILING
LIMIT

STATE
COMPENSATION
MAX LIMIT
(IN USD)

May present an
oral or written
statement to
the Senior
Hearing
Officer of the
Board prior to
the hearing
Written or oral
statement

3 years

25,000; 60,000
for catastrophic
injuries

2 years

Written
statement;
interview with
or submission
of audiotape or
videotape to
the parole
board prior to
the hearing
Written
statement218

1 year

20,000; 60,000
for catastrophic
injuries
No medical
maximum;
limits on other
expenses

2 years

30,000;
additional 5,000
for funeral
expenses

218. Victims of violent or assaultive crimes whose offenders are in medium or
minimum custody have the opportunity to appear before the Commission in Raleigh to
present information they feel is important for the Parole Commissioners to hear. The
meetings are held once a week, are 30 minutes each and are limited to five persons per
scheduled appointment. There is a limited number of appointments available and they
are scheduled on a first-come first-serve basis.
Victim Information, N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, https://www.ncdps.gov/Index2.cfm?a=
000003,002210,002214 (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
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STATE
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STATE
CONS’T
AMEND.

VICTIM
ALLOWED
TO BE

PRESENT
AT PAROLE
HEARING
Dependent
on crime
type

N.D.

-

Ohio

✓

✓

Okla.

✓

✓

Or.

✓

✓

Pa.

-

✓
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VIS
PRESENTATION
FORMAT AT
PAROLE

FILING
LIMIT

STATE
COMPENSATION
MAX LIMIT
(IN USD)

Written
statement;
however,
victims of
violent crime
may personally
appear to give
an oral
statement
Written
statement;
presentation of
the written
statement
allowed at the
hearing; meet
or
teleconference
with parole
board member
prior to the
hearing
Written
statement;
petition; oral
statement
Written
statement; oral
statement by
victim or
appointed
counsel
Written or oral
statement;
videotaped
statement

1 year

25,000

No limit

50,000

1 year

6 months

20,000; 40,000
in catastrophic
cases and
homicides
47,000

2 years

46,500
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STATE
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STATE
CONS’T
AMEND.

VICTIM
ALLOWED
TO BE

R.I.

✓

PRESENT
AT PAROLE
HEARING
-

S.C.

✓

✓

S.D.

-

✓

Tenn.

✓

✓

Tex.

✓

_

Utah

✓

✓

Vt.

-

✓
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VIS
PRESENTATION
FORMAT AT
PAROLE

FILING
LIMIT

STATE
COMPENSATION
MAX LIMIT
(IN USD)

Meeting prior
to the hearing
with the board,
or written
statement
Written or oral
statement;
video or teleconferencing
into the
hearing
Written or oral
statement
Written or oral
statement
Oral statement
presented to
the board prior
to the hearing;
written
statement
Written or oral
statement

3 years

25,000

180 days

15,000; 25,000
in catastrophic
cases

1 year

15,000

1 year

30,000

3 years

50,000; 125,000
when injuries
are permanent
and total

No limit

25,000;
additional
25,000 medical
is base amount
exceeded
10,000

Written or oral
statement;
audio or visual
recording

No limit
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STATE
CONS’T
AMEND.

VICTIM
ALLOWED
TO BE

Va.

✓

PRESENT
AT PAROLE
HEARING
-

Wash.

✓

-219

D.C.220

-

✓221
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VIS
PRESENTATION
FORMAT AT
PAROLE

FILING
LIMIT

STATE
COMPENSATION
MAX LIMIT
(IN USD)

Written
statement;
meeting with
the parole
board in person
or via
teleconference
prior to the
hearing
Written or oral
statements;
recorded
statementsaudio tape,
videotapes,
CD’s or other
electronic
means; video
or teleconference
Written or oral
statement;
statement via
audio or video
during the
hearing

1 year

25,000

2 years

50,000

1 year

25,000

219. Washington state has an Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB), which only
reviews two types of cases; in all other instances there is no parole. Indeterminate Sentence
Review Board, DEP’T OF CORR. WASH. STATE, http://www.doc.wa.gov/isrb/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2015).
220. Washington D.C. does not have a sovereign constitution, but still provides for victims’
rights under its statutes. D.C. CODE § 23-1901 (2015).
221. In 1997, the District of Columbia Board of Parole was abolished resulting in the transfer
of authority for parole matters to the U.S. Parole Commission. Id. at § 14-131.
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STATE
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STATE
CONS’T
AMEND.

VICTIM
ALLOWED
TO BE

W. Va.

-

PRESENT
AT PAROLE
HEARING
✓

Wis.

✓

✓

Wyo.

-

-
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VIS
PRESENTATION
FORMAT AT
PAROLE

FILING
LIMIT

STATE
COMPENSATION
MAX LIMIT
(IN USD)

Oral statement;
written
statement; or a
meeting with a
parole board
member prior
to the hearing
Written
statement or
oral statement
Prior to the
hearing victims
can submit a
statement to
the board
either orally,
written, via
teleconference,
video, or
through a DVD
or audio
recording

2 years

35,000; 50,000
in homicides;
100,000 in
catastrophic
cases

1 year

40,000;
additional 2,000
for funerals
15,000; 25,000
for catastrophic
cases

1 year

